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NT . DUDLEY BURTON"
The following material includes over one hundred and fifty reported
cases of the Supreme Court of Florida in the decade and a half since the
enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act. For practical reasons the
writer has followed the outline of the Act, and only Florida case law is in-
cluded, except where a Florida case was decided on the basis of a foreign
decision.
WORKMIEN'S COMPENSATION - AN INSURANCE CON'RAC'I'
2
"Workmen's Compensation is a product of industrialism, and proceeds
on the theory that economic loss to the individual by injury in line of duty
shonld be borne in part by the industry in which he is employed, in order
that his dependents ma' not want." 3 Every employer and employee, except
those specifically excluded from the Act,4 are presumed to accept the pro-
visions of the Act unless written notice to the contrary is given, 5 and in
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Carlton,6 the court said that where an
employer, employee, and carrier have accepted the application of work-
men's compensation, such acceptance "constitutes a contract between the
parties embracing the provisions of the statutes as they may exist at the time
of any injury compensable under the terms of the statute." Also, in Chan-
berlain v. Florida Power Corporation,7 the court held that where an employer
and employee have accepted workmen's compensation, their contract of
employment takes in all of the provisions of the Act. An employee sued his
employer for personal injuries, alleging that his employer had not posted a
notice that compensation had been secured, as required by the Act.8 The
court held that compliance with the posting of this notice by the employer
was not prerequisite to the statutory acceptance of the Act, but that all of
the sections of the Act would be considered together, and that this section0 9
did not in any way limit or control other sections of the Act. 10 Any employer
or employee excluded from the Act can waive this exclusion and accept the
Act." Every employer that comes within the Act is required either to secure
*Nleinber Fia. Bar.
1. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 17481 (effective 1 luly 1935).
2. FLA. SrAT. §§ 440.03,cx,.04,.O5,.U 6,.07 ,.lO,.l ,,l1,.21,.22,.23,.38,AU,A1,.42,.43
(1949).
3. Duff Hotel v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790 (1942).
4. FLA. Smar. § 440.02 (1949).
5. 1tughes v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 152 Fla. 170, 11 So.2d 313 (1943); Mobile
Elevator Co. v. White, 39 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1949); Loveioy Co. v. Ackis, 153 Fla. 876,
16 So.2d 297 (1944).
6. 151 Fia. 238, 9 So.2d 359 (1942); Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland,
134 Fla. 472, 18 So.2d 251 (1944).
7. 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (1940).
8. FLA. STAT. § 440.40 (1949).
9. See note 8 supra,
10. Scc note 3 supra.
11. FLx. STr. § 440.05 (1949); see also note 3 supra, and Lovejoy Co. v. Aekis,
153 Fia. 876, 16 So.2d 297 (1944).
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compensation coverage from an insurance company, or qualify as a self-
insurer under the provisions of the Act.'
2
In a workmen's compensation insurance policy, when a carrier assumes
to insure the payment of compensation by an employer, they are bound to
pay whatever compensation is lawfully adjudged against the employer.' s
Such policy is construed "to mean the activities of the insured with whom
the (insurance) company was then dealing," and does not cover employees
of an employer who became the assignee of such policy upon the purchase
of a business which the policy covered.' 4 An employer, under the Act, is
guilty of a misdemeanor if he fails to secure the payment of compensation, 1
and an injured employee may sue an employer at law, and the common law
defenses of negligence of a fellow servant, contributory negligence, and
assumption of risk, would not be available to him. 16 A plea of contributory
negligence was denied to an employer where he had failed to secure compen-
sation, and where an employee had sued for an injury.' 7 But where a widow
of a linesman sued her husband's employer, contributory negligence was
allowed as a diminution of damages only because of the statutory hazardous
occupation involved.' 8 An employee cannot enter into a contract with his
employer to pay part of the cost of workmen's compensation,'9 nor can an
employee assign his compensation to creditors.20 Compensation is a lien
against the assets of the carrier or employer, 2' and every insurance policy in-
cludes a provision that insolvency of the employer shall not relieve the car-
rier from paying compensation. 22 Where two insurance companies were
held to have compensation policies in force during the same period, the
court allowed contribution by one insurance company against the other for
half of the amount of an award.23 The employee is subject to the common
law defenses in a suit at law if he alone elects not to come under the Act,
24
but where both the employer and employee reject the Act, the employer,
only, is penalized by losing his right to the common law defenses.
25
Where the employer fails to secure payment of compensation, the employee,
or his legal representative, has the choice of electing to claim compensation
12. FLA. STAT. § 440.38 (1949); see also note 3 supra.
13. Moody v. Baxley, 158 Fla. 357, 28 So.2d 325 (1946); see also FtA. SrAr.
§ 440.41 (1949). 9
14. Great American Indemnity Co. v. Smith, 156 Fa. 662, 24 So.2d 42 (1945).
15. FLxA. STAT. § 440.43 (1949).
16. Jones v. Brink, 39 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1949).
17. Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Thurman, 153 Fla. 906, 16 So.2d 289 (1944),
18. Tampa Electric Co. v. Hardy, 139 Fla. 142, 190 So. 478 (1939); see FLA. STAT.
§ 769.03 (1949).
19. FLA. STAT. § 440.21 (1949).
20. FLA. STAT. § 440.22 (1949).
21. FLA. STAT. § 440.23 (1949).
22. FLA. STAT. § 440.42 (1949).
23. Continental Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co., 151 Fla. 742, 10
So.2d 440 (1942); see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Clements, 148 Fla. 175, 3 So.2d 865
(1941).
24. FLA. STAT. § 440.07 (1949).
25. FLA. STAT. § 440.08 (1949).
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or sue at law, but-where the employer has properly secured the payment of
compensation, and the employee has not previously elected to reject the
Act, the liability of the employer is limited to the statutory requirements of
the Act.2
8
A general contractor is liable for compensation to the employees of a
sub-contractor where the sub-contractor has failed to secure compensation
insurance coverage,27 and the court, in construing this section, said: "We
think that the the applicable provisions of the Florida Workmen's Com-
pcnsation Law make it entirely clear that all workmen engaged in the same
contract work are deemed to be employed in one and the same business or es-
tablishment, and without regard to whether they are employed by the general
contractor, or by a sub-contractor under him, are to be considered for corn-
pcusation purposes as the employees of the general contractor." 2  The re-
lationship of an employee to an independent contractor, under the Act,
will be considered;2" however, the relationship of an independent contractor
to a sub-contractor was decided in Underwood v. Beasley, 30 where the claim-
ant, an employee of Scay, made a claim for compensation from Underwood,
alleging that Sea), was the sub-contractor ci Underwood. The supreme court
denied compensation, deciding that Seay was an independent contractor,
and therefore the claimant could not make a claim against Underwood for
compensation. 3'
EXCLUSIONS UNDER THE ACT
32
The legislature has seen fit to exclude certain types of employment from
the Act, and the supreme court has interpreted these exclusions to include,
in addition to publicly elected officers, any person assisting an officer 3 at
his request in connection with the arresting of a person charged with a
crime, saying such a party "was a mere assistant to an elected officer who
was barred of compensation by the terms of the Act."'" The original Act
excluded "agricultural and horticultural farm labor," but it was
amended in 1941 to read "agricultural farm labor." An employee pruning
citrus trees claimed compensation under the theory that the legislature in-
tended to include horticultural workers under the Act. The court decided,
in denying the claim,aa that such change in wording by the legislature was
26. See note 13 supra; see Brickley v. Gulf Coast Const. Co., 153 Fla. 216, 14 So.2d
263 (1943).
27. FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1949). Vanlandingham v. Fla. Power & Lt. Go., 154
Fia, 628, 18 So.2d 678 (1944).
28. Brickley v. Gulf Coast Construction Co., 153 Fla. 216, 14 So.2d 265 (1943);
see Younger v. Giller Contracting Co., Inc., 143 Fla. 355, 196 So.2d 690 (1940).
29. See notes 39-45 infra.
30. 153 Fla. 869, 15 So.2d 907 C1943).
31. Underwood v. Beasley, supra note 30 (decided on the basis of Gentile Bros. Co.
v. Fia. Industrial Comrn'n, 151 Fla. 857, 10 So.2d 568 (1942), an unemployment corn-
pensation case).
32. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (1949).
33. As authorized by ILA. SrTr. § 843.06 (1949).
34. Leon County v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 171, 9 So.2d 461 (1942).
35. Tison v. Flyer, 153 Fla. 769, 16 So.2d 437 (1944).
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a matter of redundancy, and that a new class was not created. Under the
exclusion of "professional athletes . . . trainers, masseurs, and similar per-
formers," the court, in an action brought by a jockey against his employer
where fhe employer had failed to secure workmen's compensation cover-
age,"' held that the legislature did not intend to exclude horse racing. The
exclusion of employers with less than three employees from the Act, was
held not to be a mandatory exclusion, so as to keep two employees of an
Alabama Corporation, doing business in Florida, from the provisions of the
Act. The court, in allowing the claim, decided the figure of "three or more
employees" was only an arbitrary figure to form the dividing line between
those businesses that could afford to come under the Act, and those who
could not, and where the industry was of sufficient size to afford to com6
under the Act, they would disregard such arbitrary line. Domestic servants
and employees in the turpentine industry, which are excluded by the Act,
have not been under review by the supreme court.
The original Act excluded employees working on a commission or per-
centage basis. This exclusion was deleted by the legislature in 1937.38 A per-
son that qualifies as an independent contractor under the Act cannot claim
compensation as an employee from the general contractor. Since the Act
does not define an independent contractor, it must be determined by the
Courts on facts of each case. The chief test used by the Florida Supreme
Court has been the "control" test, as to the amount and right of control the
contracting party has over the party performing the work. This test also ap-
plies to the control of the method used to perform the work. Where a
plasterer repaired a store at night, it was held he was not an independent con-
tractor, because the store owner furnished the materials, a ladder, and con-
trolled the premises while the work was in progress. aO This case40 was dis-
tinguished where a "handy man" replaced a neon sign on a restaurant, used
his own tools and ladder, and there was no supervision of the work. The
court ruled that if an employee was subject to the control of the employer
only as to the results, he was an independent contractor. 4' This test was
followed where a laundry truck driver owned his own truck, had his own
hours, could solicit business from anyone within a certain territory, and
derived his income from the wholesale delivery of laundry to his customers. 2
A citrus inspector, during the fruit season, located and inspected fruit for
purchase, and was paid a commission on all fruit purchased through his
services. He was held an employee since be could not use his own judgment
in buying such fruit.43 A contract to cut logs on land owned by a third
36. Jones v. Brink, 39 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1949).
37. Mobile Elevator Co. v. White, 39 So.2d. 799 (Fla. 1949).
38. Magarian v. Southern Fruit Distributors, 146 Fla. 773, 1 So.2d 858 (1941).
39. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Pixrer, 140 Fla. 677, 192 So. 617 (1940).
40. See note 39 supra.
41. Baya's Bar and Grill v. Alcorn, 40 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1949).
42. De Luxe Laundry and Dry Cleaners v. Frady, 40 So.2d 779 (F12. 1949).
43. See note 38 suora.
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party, where the claimant supplied his own tools and had complete control
dcr his men, was held to establish an independent contractor. 4  But where
a logger did not have complete control of his employees, and did not furnish
all of his own tools and equipment, he was held to be an employee.' 5 Where
an employee is employed to work for two corporations, the "control" test is
used to determine whether he is a "special" or a "general" employee at the
time of his accident, and the corporation that pays the wages does not in
itself determine this relationship. 4" A shucker of oysters, who *Was solicited
by the manager of the wharves to shuck oysters in the bins supplied to the
tongers of their catch, was held not to be an employee of the owner of the
wharf, because he was under the control of a tonger.4
An officer, owning controlling interest in the corporation, was held to
come within the Act, the court saying "the ownership of stock or holding
an office in a private corporation is not inconsistent with the . . . statute".' 8
The term "casual" employment, as defined in the Act, was discussed
in New Fort Pierce Hotel Company Y. Gorley0 , where it wa held that a
helper to an engineer in charge of repair work at the hotel, was within the
Act, and not a "casual" employee. However, even though the employment
is "casual", the injury is compensable if it happened within the course of
the employer's business °50 State, county, and municipal employees come
within the Act."
DEFINITIONS UNDER THE AcT
I. INJURY5 2 AND DISABILITY
Ali injury under the Act includes "such diseases or infection (that) ...
naturally or unavoidably result. . . ." A testicle was removed because of an
injury in the course of employment and was held within the Act.53 Death
caused by sunstroke was held to be an injury within the Act,64 as was a cer-
ebral hemorrhage;5 however, death by heart disease was held not to come
within the Act.5 Where the claimant received two injuries in one accident,
he was allowed to make separate claims under the statute. 7 Disability, with-
in the Act, is defined as "incapacity, because of the injury to earn . . . the
wages . . . received at the time of the injury." It has been held that this
44. Peterson v. Highland Crate Co-op, 156 Fla. 539, 23 So.2d 716 (1945).
45. Taylor v. Williams, 40 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1949).
46. Berrier v. Associated Indemnity Co., 142 Fla. 351, 196 So. 188 (1939).
47. Patton Seafood Co. v. Glisson, 38 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1949).
48. Claude 11. Wolfe Inc. v. Wolfe, 154 Fla.. 633, 18 So.2d 535 (1944).
49. 137 Fla. 345, 188 So. 340 (1939).
50. Persing v. Citizens Traction Co., 294 Pa. 230, 144 Ati. 97 (1928) (quoted
with approval in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Pixler, see note 39 supra); see note 34, supra.
51. See note 34 supra.
52. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (6) (9) (1949).
53. Cone Bros. Contracting d. v. Massey, 145 Fla. 56, 198 So. 802 (1940).
54. Alexander Orr Jr. v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 129 Fla. 369, 176 So. 172
(193.- Davis v. Artley Construction Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944).
56. Cleary Bros. Construction Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525 (1945).
57. Daytona Beach Boat Works v. Spencer, 153 Fla. 540, 15 So.2d 256 (1943).
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definition does not establish earning capacity as the sole and exclusive tct
of disability.""
II. Wages and Compensation9
If "an employee received consideration other than cash" for a portion
of his wages, the value of such consideration is determined by the Com-
mission. Wber an employee was furnished board and lodging as part of
his wages, the Commission found twelve dollars and fifty cents a week, for
use of the room, as reasonable,6 but where an employer continued paying
an employee his salary, even though he was unable to work, this was con-
sidered a gift by the employer to the employee.6 1 Compensation is the
money allowance payable to an employee or his dependents as provided in
the Act, whereas medical treatment or hospitalization, furnished under the
Act, does not come within the meaning of compensation as contemplated
by the Statute. 2 In Allen v. Maxwell Co.,63 it was stated: "The intention
of the Act is to compensate the employee for the loss of earning capacity.
If the employee is injured, but is able to work, he is not compensated."
III. Dependents4
The Act does not define who are dependents, and therefore this is a
question of fact to be determined in each case."5 However, dependency is
not a question of fact where a wife has been deserted by her husband and
is working for a "modest sum," because the "terms of the Act render the
husband liable for her support." 68  Ifo Contractors' Contract No. 1/5948 v.
Morris,17 the court said dependency was not the "governing criterion" where
there is a wife involved, since the law requires the husband to support his
wife. This rule is also generally applied where the claimant leaves a child-8
or stepchild, 9 and even where the grandmother had cared for and sup-
ported her grandchildren for two years prior to their father's death, they
were held as dependents within the Act.70 However, where a widow left
her husband eight months before his death, and was living with another
man three months prior to her husband's death, she was not living apart
from her husband for a justifiable cause, and compensation was denied.'
The fact that the widow was neglected by her husband, and had not lived
with him or been supported by him in many years, does not alter her de-
58. Dixie Laundry v. Wentzell, 145 Fla. 569, 200 So. 860 (1940).
59. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (11), (12) (1949).
60. New Fort Pierce Hotel Co. v. Gorley, 137 Fla. 345, 188 So. 340 (1939).
61. Sweat v. Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348 (1941).
62. Royer v. United States Sugar Corp., 148 Fla. 537, 4 So.2d 692 (1941),
63. Allen v. Maxwell Co., 152 Fla. 340, 11 So.2d 572 (1943).
64. FIL. STAT. §§ 440.02 (13), (14), (15), (16) and 440.16 (1941).
65. Panama City Stevedoring Co. v. Padgett, 149 Fla. 687, 6 So.2d 822 (1942).
66. Johnson v. Midland Constructors Inc., 152 Fla. 289, 11 So.2d 895 (1943).
67. 154 Fla. 497, 18 So.2d 247 (1944).
68. Tigertail Quarries Inc. v. Ward, 154 Fla. 122, 16 So.2d 812 (1944).
69, See note 63 supra.
70. Butler v. Morgan, 157 Fla. 1, 24 So.2d 571 (1946).
71. See note 65 supra.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
pendency status.72 If the employee leaves more than one wife at the time
of his death, the party asserting that there are two wives must do more than
just allege this, since there is a presumption of the validity of a second mar-
riage, and the one disputing such validity must overcome the presumption."
It was held that this presumption was overcome where the original wife
proved that her husband had lived in the same county since the date of
their marriage, with the exception of short trips to three other states, where
documents from the Bureau of Vital Statistics of these states indicated that
no divorce had been granted, that her whereabouts, at all times, had been
known by the deceased, and that she had never received a notice of a divorce.
I lowever, since the original wife was not dependent on the deceased and
not living apart from him for a justifiable cause, compensation was denied to
both widows. 74 Where the employee's widow was confined to a mental in-
stitution at the time of his death, it was held that she came within the stat-
utorv definition of '.'widow," and she was "dependent upon him for support
and living apart for justifiable cause," and that the compensation should be
paid to her guardian for her benefit.75 However, where the wife was killed
in the course of her employment, it was held that the widower was not a
dependent, since he was drawing ten percent disability from the government
as a disabled veteran, and a weekly salary of fifty dollars.7 6
In C. W. \Wheeler Co. v. Pullins," the court decided that the statute
did not intend to exclude an acknowledged illegitimate and posthumous
child because of the use of the disjunctive "or" in the statute, since it would
be inconsistent to say that a born acknowledged illegitimate child was a de-
pendent, but that an unborn acknowledged illegitimate child was not a de-
pcndcnt. Where the parent, brother, or sister of the deceased claims de-
pcndency, the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish such depend-
ency by showing: (1) mental or physical incapacity to work, (2) substantial
support must have been given by the deceased, and (3) such support must
have been regular with reasonable expectation that it would have continued
in the future.TA It was held that dependency is not shown by the moral or
statutory obligation of the child to support the parent.79 Such dependency
must be shown by the parent at the time of the death of the son.O Contri-
butions toward payment of the mortgage of the parents' home is not sufficient
to establish the father as a dependent,8t and where a mother had not seen
or hcard of her son for two years prior to death, she was not a dependent.
8 2
72. Wilson Cypress Co. v. Miller, 157 Fla. 459, 26 So.2d 441 (1946).
73. I. J Cater Furniture Co. v. Banks, 152 Fla. 337, 11 So.2d 776 (1943).
74, 1l lycr Lovan v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 155 Fla. 144, 19 So.2d 838,
(1944).
7:t. Gibbs Gas Engine Co. v. Jackson, 159. Fla. 86, 31 So.2d .51 (1947).
76. Lewis v. Brandon, 40 Sold 843 (Fla, 1949).
77. 152 FI. 96, 11 So.2d 303 (1942).
7h. Sherman v. Florida Tar and Creosote Corp., 160 Fla. 696, 36 So.2d 267 (1948).
79. See note 65 supra.
SI. Moorcr v. Putnam Lumber Co., 152 Fla. 520, 12 So.2d 370 (1943).
81. Stone, & Stone v. Scott, 151 Fla. 21, 9 So.2d 168 (1942).
S2. Clyde Beattv's Jungle Zoo v. Morello, 154 Fla. 626, 18 So.2d 680 (1944).
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Where the son had contributed to the support of his parents since the age of
sixteen, they were dependents,83 and where the insurance carrier had paid
compensation to the employee's mother for forty-seven weeks, a contract
entered into by half-brothers of the deceased with the mother, to pay her
fifteen dollars weekly, would not change her status as a dependent.84  The
original Act stated that the amount of compensation payable "shall not
exceed fifty per centum if no dependents," 8 5 and this was construed to re-
quire payment of compensation to the personal representative of the de-
ceased. " However, an amendment in 1937 to this section provided that no
compensation, except funeral expenses, should be allowed for a deceased
employee with no dependents, but five hundred dollars would be paid to
the Florida Industrial Commission to become part of the Administrative
Fund, as set up in the Act. This amendment was held to be part of the
contract of employment when the provisions of the Act were accepted by
the employer and employee, and therefore the personal representative of
the deceased employee was bound by this contract, and could not bring an
action against the employer for the death of the employee.87 Where the
Florida Industrial Commission made a claim under this section, it was
held not to be "a claim for compensation," but was merely a statutory levy
payable to the sovereign state as represented by the Florida Industrial Coni-
mission.s8
IV. Accident""
An "accident" is defined as "an unexpected or unusual event, happening
suddenly." The leading Florida case interpreting this section is S. H. Kress
and Co. v. Burkes,90 where the claimant worked in a bakery mixing dough,
and, over a period of a year, knots came on her hand. She stated she sus-
tained no blow but felt pain, and then noticed the knots. The court said:
"This condition undoubtedly was brought on by constant and rtpeated strain
of the parts involved, occasioned by the type of work the woman had done
over a period of months, (but) the injury here cannot be said to be sudden.
Claimant herself said it came on gradually and first appeared about a year
before. No stated period can be given as sudden as applied to each case, as
each must naturally depend on its own circumstances .. . .This court, as
many others, has rejected the contention that in order to show an injury by
accident, some traumatic injury must be shown, or some definite incident
83. McCall v. Motor Fuel Carriers Inc., 155 Fla. 854, 22 So.2d 153 (1945).
84. Palm Beach Dairy Co. v. Ryan, 154 Fla. 648, 18 So.2d 537 (1944).
85. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17481 § 16 (6).
86. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sutherland, 125 Fla. 282, 169 So. 679 (1936).
87. Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp., 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (1940).
88. Florida Industrial Conm'n v. Felda Lumber Co., 154 Fla. 507, 18 So.2d 362
(1944).
89. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (19) (1941). -
90. S. H. Kress and Co. v. Burkes, 153 Fla. 868, 16 So.2d 106 (1944).
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at a definite time and place must be shown." 9' The court further stated:
"that 'accident' as used in this Act would not be given a strict or literal defi-
nition, however, we cannot overlook the definition given by the Legisla-
ture." 12 An accident was held to occur where a painter contracted nephritis,
caused from the fumes of a solution of bichloride of mercury,98 but where
a fircman jumped out of his bed sustaining a slipping of the vertebra, it was
held that there was no accident, since nothing unusual happened to the
claimant when he got out of bed to answer a fire alarm. 94 Wfiere a laborer
had a heart attack and fell out of a box ear, the court said: "The deceased
did not fall out of the box car as a result of any accident. He did not slip,
trip or stumble. He did not lose his balance and fall. He was not pushed,
knocked or jostled out of the car . . . . The fact that he collapsed at his
work, even though the work was arduous, is not sufficient, within itself, to
make out a case for recovery."9' 5 In the case of Davis v. Artley Construction
Company98 , the claimant, a laborer in a box car, had dizzy spells during a
very hot day, and the following day returned to work and sustained a cerebral
hemorrhage. The Davis case was distinguished in the Nobles9 case on the
basis that where an employee, afflicted with disease, receives an injury under
such circumstances, compensation would have been allowed; therefore the
fact that he has the disease would not exclude him from receiving compen-
sation. The court stated that the Nobles case did not come within this rule.
A claimant, poisoned with coal-tar paint, although no trauma was present,
had met with an accident under the Act.98 In defining the meaning of
"accident 'tgo in hernia cases, it was held that it is not necessary to have some
unusual nishap.'00
Disability from pre-existing disease, when accelerated or aggravated by
an accident, is compensable to the extent such acceleration or aggravation
is "reasonably attributable to the accident." In interpreting pre-existing
disease, the court has said: "If a merger of the pre-existing disease and the
injury sustained results in his disablement, or the pre-existing disease is ac-
celerated or aggravated by an injury arising out of the course of employment,
then it becomes a compensable injury."' 0' A claimant, sustaining a trauma
to his arm while in the course of his employment, died within a month from
leukemia. It was held that he had a life expectancy of four years, which
was terminated by the injury which accelerated his death, and an award of
91. But cf. Meehan v. Crowder, 158 Fla. 36, 28 So.2d 435 (1947) (where the
court held the element of time, place, and cause necessary to prove an accident).
92. See note 88 supra.
93. See note 89 sup a.
94. Tallahassee v. Roberts, 155 Fla. 815, 21 So.2d, 712 (1945).
95. Cleary Bros. Construction Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525 (1945).
96. Davis v. Artley Construction Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944).
97. See note 95 supra.
98. Rayonier, Inc. v. Lang, 153 Fla. 396, 14 So.2d 569 (1943), quoted in 153
Fla. 188, 16 So.2d 107 (1944).
99. FLA. STAT. § 440.16 (6)(d) (1941).
100. Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790 (1942).
101. Allen v. Maxwell Co., 152 Fla. 340, 11 So.2d 572 (1943).
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four years compensation was affirmed by the supreme court.' 2  However,
where claimants had a pre-existing deformity of the back'0", cancer of the
testicle 104 , and diabetes'05, the court found an acceleration or aggravation in
each case, and awaTded the full statutory compensation without prorating
the "disability reasonably attributable to the accident." Compensation was
denied to a claimant with diabetes because "the evidence adduced fails to
show or establish a causal connection between the injury sustained on Jtuc
11, 1945, and the acceleration or aggravation of claimant's diabetes, which
became so pronounced fifteen months later." 106  The court distinguished
death from a disease connected with an accident, and death from a discase
unrelated to an accident, in Consolidated GroweTs Ass'n v. Kruse'07. Com-
pensation was denied from death by uremia, the court stating that when a
claimant dies from an injury because of weakness from a pre-existing disease,
compensation is allowed, but if a claimant dies from a disease that is unre-
lated to an accidental injury, then compensation is denied.
"ARISING OUT OF" AND "IN THE COURSE OF" EMPLOYMENT' 0 8
It has been frequently stated by the courts that, in order for a claimant
to support his right to a claim, he must prove (1) that an accident'0 9 oc-
curred, and (2) that this accident arose out of and in the course of his em-
ployment." 0 Sweat v. Allen,"' is the leading Florida case where an em-
ployee is injured going to or from work. In that case the claimant, a dcputy
sheriff, was in an auto accident on the way to work. The court stated that
the general rule in such cases is that accidental injuries to employees going
to and from work are not deemed to arise out of and in the course of their
employment, but that each case must be decided on its own facts. Since
the claimant was on twenty-four hour call, it was held that the accident was
within his employment. Similarly, where an employee was killed on the
highway while walking to work, the court found the employee's duties made
him subject to twenty-four hour call,.and thus the case was within the ex-
ception to the general rule set out in Sweat v. Allen." 2 I-lowever, an officer
and parts manager of an auto service station that furnished twenty-four
service was held not to be within the exception. It was shown that the em-
ployee was on the way to his office on a Sunday evening, after taking his
102. Intercontinent Aircraft Corp. v. Pickton, 154 Fla. 8, 16 So.2d 292 (1944).
103. Star Fruit Co. v. Canady, 159 Fla. 488, 32 So.2d 2 (1947).
104. Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Massey, 145 Fla. 56. 198 So. 802 (1940).
105. Borden's Dairy v. Zanders, 42 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1949).
106. Morris v. American Mach. Corp., 40 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1949).
107. 159 Fla. 405, 31 So.2d 545 (1947).
108. FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (1949).
109. See note 89 supra.
110. General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So.2d 908 (1944); Sims
Tire Service Inc. v, Parker, 146 F1a. 23, 200 So. 524 (1941): Fidelity and Cas. Co.
of N. Y. v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495 (1940).
111. 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348 (1941).
112. Bowen v. Keen, 154 Fla. 161, 17 So.2d 706 (1944).
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family home, and the court held this constituted a "personal mission." '" s
Also, where a construction superintendent went to an annual "good will"
outing given by his employer, and was fatally injured on his way home, the
court said that death did not arise out of and in the course of his employ-
ment, but "occurred at a time when the employee was engaged in the pur-
suit of his own private and personal affairs."'114  In Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Taylor,"" the court stated that the terms "arising out of" and "in the course
of employment" had to be used conjunctively. The claimaiit secured a
friend to drive his truck route "to observe his qualifications for the job,"
followed in his own car, and was killed on the return trip. The court said
it might be conceded that the claimant was "in the course of his employ-
ment" at the time of his death, as he was in the service of his employer, but
that the claimant's death did not "arise out of" his employment, since at
the exact time of the accident, claimant "was not where he should have
been to fulfill the obligations he owed his employer."
NVhere the employer furnishes transportation to and from work, the
employer's liability for an injury to an employee using such transportation
generally depends on whether there is an express or implied contract be-
tween the employer and employee to furnish such transportation." 6 Where
an employee preferred to ride with someone else, and the employer did not
object to this, the court held this "did not change her status of being in the
line of her employers' business."' 117 A claimant was working as a cook in his
employers' restaurant, and was instructed to go to his employers' farm after
work and install a lock on a door, for which he was paid overtime. The
court held where the employment relation exists, the fact that the employee
is temporarily performing services not usually required of him in such em-
ployment, does not exclude such services from arising in the usual course of
employment?'18 A manager, attempting to manipulate a crick in the neck
of a waitress and injuring her;1 a hotel hostess, slipping in the shower on
the way to answer the telephone for service to a guest;120 a tractor driver,
struck by lightning while waiting under a tree during a storm;' 2' a logger,
burning to death while asleep on a house boat, under the "bunk-house
rule";1 2 and a laborer, hit by a passing truck while going to get his hat, were
all held to be within the course of their employment. 128 The court said
113. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103 196 So. 495 (1940).
114. Duval Engineering and Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 154 Fla. 9, 16 So.2d
290 (i944).
115. 147 Fla. 210, 3 So.2d 381 (1941).
116. Southern States Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 146 Fla. 29, 200 So. 375 (1941).
117. Kennedy v. Fulghurn, 159 Fla. 896, 32 So.2d 919 (1947); Cohen v. Sloan,
138 Fla. 752, 190 So. 14 (1939).
118. Moody v. Baxley, 158 Rla. 357, 28 So.2d 325 (1946).
119. Stone-Brady, Inc. v. Heim, 152 Fla. 710, 12 So.2d 888 (1943).
120. Neuman v. Shelbourne Grand Hotel, 155 Fla. 491, 20 So.2d 677 (1945).
121. Fort Pierce Growers Assn'n v. Storey, 144 Fla. 769, 21 So.2d 451 (1945).
122. Wilson Cypress Co. v. Miller 157 Fla. 459, 26 So.2d 441 (1946).
123. Bituminous Gas. Corp. v. Richardson, 148 Fla. 323, 4 So.2d 378 (1941).
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in the later case: "The necessity for him to stop and get his hat was an
incident which occurred in connection with his employment." Where a
citrus worker was "ordered" by his foreman to take a jeep and go for his
lunch, and was injured on the return trip, the court allowed recovery saying:
"The intent of the employer was advanced by the foreman in directing the
employee to take the appellant's 'jeep' and go to Sunset Point and obtain
lunch,"' 2' but another employee, fatally injured in the same accident, was
denied compensation, because he "voluntarily got in the truck seat by the
driver .. .and was so riding when killed."'1 5 The Act provides compensa-
tion for an accidental injury occurring outside of the state, provided: (1)
That the contract of employment was made within the state, and that the
employment did not specify service to be exclusively outside of the state,
and (2) That the employer's place of business is within the state, or that
the residence of the employee is within the state.126
No compensation is payable if the injury "was occasioned primarily" by
the intoxicAtion of the employee, the willful intent of the employee to injure
or kill himself or another, or by his willful refusal to use a safety appliance
or observe a safety rule. However, the statute provides a presumption "in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary" that the injury was not
caused by intoxication or the willful intent to kill himself or another.1 27
It was held where a painter fell off of a scaffold "that the injury was not
occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the injured employee," 128 and
that one bottle of beer and possibly some wine does paot show an employee
under the influence of liquor 2.1 9 The testimony of an attending physician,
that he smelled liquor on the breath of the deceased, was not sufficient to
establish his intoxication.' 30 Where a forest ranger and a fire tower watch-
man got into an argument in connection with the report of a fire, and there
was an exchange of gunshots killing the forest ranger and seriously injuring
the fire tower watchman, it was held that the evidence was conflicting as to
who was the instigator of thc shooting, and therefore, under the presumptic-n
set up by the Act, the fire tower watchman, who was the claimant, was en-
titled to compensation. 1 In a recent case the claimant, within three months
after sustaining serious accidental injuries, took poison and died. The court
held that the employee had committed suicide, but in the present case they
interpreted "willful intention" not to include a case where the injuries suf-
fered by the deceased resulted in his becoming devoid of normal judgment
124. Heller Bros. Packing Co. v. Lewis, 155 Fla. 430, 20 So.2d 385 (1945).
125. Heller Bros. Packing Co. v. Kendricks, 155 Fla. 428, 20 So.2d 387 (1945).
126. See Butler v. Morgan, 157 Fla. 1, 24 So.2d 571 (1946); Lovejoy Co. v. Ackis,
153 Fla. 876, So.2d 297 (1944); Forehand v. Manly, 147 Fla. 287, 2 So.2d 864
14 . FLa.. STAT., 440.09(3) and, 440.26(3), (4) 1941.
128. Zeev. Gary, 137 Fla. 741, 189 So. 34 (1939).
129. Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Allbrook, 153 Fla. 829, 16 So.2d 61 (1943).
130. Duval Engineering and Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 154 Fla. 9, 16 So.2d
290 144orida Forest and Park Service v, Strickland, 154 Fin. 572, 18 So.2d 251
(1944).
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* . . (even though) a workman knew that he was inflicting upon himself a
mortal wound."'' 3 2 In Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Clements33 the court
held "that the accident was not caused by the injured's failure to use or
observe safety appliances or regulation."
GENERAL PROCEDURE'S'
Written notice to the commission and the employer of an injury or
death is required to be given within thirty days by the claimant, but such
requirement is waived unless an objection is made to the Commission at
the first hearing. This notice is excused if the rights of the employer have
not been prejudiced, or if the Commission decides the excuse is reasonable."3
5
There are various time limitations in the statute on the filing of claims. One
section provides that claims for compensation will be barred after two years
from the injury or death, or if the compensation has been paid, two years
after the last date of its payment. However, the above limitation is waived
unless objection is made at the first hearing.' Another section provides,
wherd there has been a change of condition or a mistake of fact, that a
hearing can be requested within one year from the last payment of compen-
sation, or from the time a claim was rejected. Any party in interest can
request this hearing.137 The first quoted section had a time limitation of
one year until it was amended to the present two year period effective June
3, 1947. The second section had a two year period until amended to one
year effective July 1, 1941. While a claimant is incompetent, the statutory
limitation will not run, 38 and where a claim for the statutory levy is made
by the state, the limitation does not apply. 139 The second limitation sec-
tion 40 was held to be mandatory as to the one year period allowed for re-
view. 11 In Royer v. United States Sugar Corp.142 the court held that med-
ical and hospital treatment was not compensation, and therefore a claim
filed within one year (now two years) from such treatment would be barred.
I Iowever, at the time of this case there was no limitation period in the statute
for medical and hospital treatment, which is now provided for in § 440.13
132. Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1949).
133. 148 Fla. 175, 3 So.2d 865 (1941).
134. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.18, .19, .25, .26, .27, .28, .29, and .36 (1949); see PROC:EED-
INGS BEFORE DEPUTY COM*uMISSIONER, Rules 1-11 incl.
135. See Borden's Dairy v. Zanders, 42 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1949); Meehan v. Crowder,
158 Fla. 361, 28 So.Zd 435 (1947); Anderson v. Jarrell, 157 Fla. 212, 25 So.2d 490
(1946).
-136. FLA. STAT. § 440.19; see Anderson v. arrell, 157 Fla. 212, 25 So.2d 490
(1946); Cullinane v. Crown Can Co., 156 Fla. 6 2, 24 So.2d 5 (1945); Canada Dry
Bottling Co. of Florida v. White, 153 Fla. 70, 13 So.2d 595 (1943); Lovejoy Co. v.
Ackis, 153 Fla. 876, 16 So.2d 297 (1944).
137. FLA. STAT. § 440.28 (1941).
138. Thomas v. Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co., 160 Fla. 687, 36 So.2d 377
(1948).
139. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Felda Lumber Co., 154 Fla. 507, 18 So.2d 362
(1944); see FLA. STAT. § 440.19(3) (1949).
140. See note 134 supra.
141. Manrose v. Miami Shipbuilding Corp., 156 Fla. 402, 23 So.2d 733 (1945).
142. 148 Fla. 537, 4 So.2d 692 (1941).
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(3) (b) of the Act. Where a lump sum payment of compensation is
made, 143 the limitation period runs from the time of its payment."
Hearings before the Commission are not subject to the technical pro-
cedural rules of the courts, but are to be conducted informall. 145  State-
ments by the deceased employee, concerning the injury, are admissible where
properly corroborated.1 48  The Commission has some procedural authority.
but such authority is quasi-judicial only, since if has no authority to enforce
its own orders or awards.' 4T It has been held frequently that the Commis-
sion sits as an administrative body only, and that a compensation claim
does not become a judicial case until it reaches the circuit court.' 48 The
circuit court gives the same weight to the findings of the Commission as
it does to the findings of law and fact by a special master in an ordinary
chancery case. 19 The right of appeal is not a constitutional privilege, and
therefore will be construed strictly according to the statute. 8 0 An appeal
is the only statutory remedy, except where it can be shown by certiorari that
the essential requirements of the law have not been complied with.' Since
the Commission does not have the authority to adjudicate, an award handed
down by the Commission would not be res adjudicata to an action brought
by an insurance company against another insurance company for contribu-
tion.152 The venue of the deputy commissioner and the circuit court is con-
trolled by the county where the injury occurred. 5 8 If the accident occurs
outside of the state, then the deputy commissioner may hear the case in the
county of the employer's residence or business, but the venue of the circuit
court applicable in suits on contract applies.'
5'
The award of the deputy commissioner becomes final within seven days
after it is filed in the office of the Commission at Tallahassee. 15 In Johnson
-v. Midland Constructions, Inc. 6 it was held that by "operation of law" the
143. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(10) (1949).
144. Daytona Beach Boat Works v. Spencer, 153 Fla. 540, 15 So.2d 256 (1943).
145. FLA. STAT. § 440.29 (1949); see Dixie Laundry v. Kentzell, 145 Fla. 569,
200 So. 860 (1940).
146. Bowen v. Keen, 154 Fla. 161, 17 So.2d 706 (1944}.
147. FLA. STAT. § 440.27 (9) (1949); see South Atlantic S. S. Co. of Delaware
v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939).
148. Duval Engineering and Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 153 Fla, 829, I6 So.2d 290
(1944); Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Allbrook, 154 Fla. 9, 16 So.Zd 61 (1943); South
Atlantic S. S. Co. of Delaware v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405 190 So. 675 (1939).
147. FLA. STAT. § 440.27(9) (1949); see South Atlantic S.S. Co of Delaware
(1940); see Ocala Mfg. Ice and Packing Co. v. Preskitt, 136 Fla. 796, 187 So. 168
(1939).
150. Miami v. Saco, 156 Fla. 634, 24 So.2d 115 (1945).
151. Weaver-Loughridge Lumber Co. v. Coleman, 139 Fla. 823, 191 So. 16 (1939).
152. Continental Cas. Co. v. Hartford Ace. and Indemnity Co., 151 Fla. 742, 10
So.2d 440 (1942),
153. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(.3) and § 440.27(3) (1949).
154. Stansell v. Marlin, 153 Fla. 421, 14 So.2d 892 (1943); FLA. STAT. § 46.01
and § 46.02 (1949).
155. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4) (1949); see Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strick-
land, 154 Fla. 472, 18 So.2d 251 (1944).
156. 150 Fla. 353, 7 So.2d 449 (1942); see Walker v. Telfair Stockton Co., 152
Fla. 434, 12 So.2d 177 (1943).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
order of the deputy commissioner became the order of the Florida Industrial
Commission after it had been filed in the latter's office for seven days, and
therefore an appeal could be carried direct to the circuit court from the deputy
commissioner. The Johnson case was overruled by Tigertail Quarries, Inc.
v. Ward,157 holding that an appeal from an award of the deputy commissioner
must be made direct to the Florida Industrial Commission, or it would be-
come final after the seven day period. The Florida Industrial Commission
reviews the record as certified by the Deputy Commissioner, and an award'
of the Commission is final within twenty days after it is filed in the office
of the Commission, unless it is appealed prior to this time to the circuit
court.' Where the Commission failed to mark the correct date on an ap-
peal notice, the court held that "the duty of appellant in this regard was
performed when it, in due course, transmitted the notice of appeal, so that
the Commission received it in time for the same to be effective."' 59 Where
an appeal from the Commission to the circuit court was made returnable
seventy-three days after the final order of the Commission was filed in the
Commission office, such was held a violation of the return day, setting a day
more than thirty and not over sixty days from the date the Commission's
order is filed in its office, and an appeal would not lie.' 60 The circuit court
will only review assignments of error made at the time of appeal to the
circuit court from the Commission. 61 An appeal to the supreme court is
made in the same manner that an appeal to the circuit court 62 is made, and
the rules of that court, applicable to equity and common law suits, do not
apply to workmen's compensation cases. 1"3
Two of the presumptions set out under the Act have previously been
discussed. 64 The other two presumptions, that the claim comes within the
Act, and that sufficient notice of the claim has been given, have been used
frequently by the courts. 65 However, these presumptions cannot be used
if there is substantial evidence to the contrary, and they do not relieve the
claimant from proving an accident occurred within the course of his employ-
ment.166
157. 154 Fla. 122, 16 So.2d 812 (1944).
158. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4) (1949); see Fort Pierce Growers v. Storey, 155 Fla.
769, 21 So.2d 451 (1945).
159. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Clements, 148 Fla. 175, 3 So.2d 865 (1941).
160. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Circuit Court of Dade County, 154 Fla. 42, 16
So2d 433 (1944); see FLA. STAT. § 440.27(4) (1949).
161. St. John River Ship Building Co., v. Wells, 156 Fla. 67, 22 So.2d 632 (1945).
162. FLA. STAT. § 440.27(12) 1949).
163. Miami v. Saco, 156 Fla. 634, 24 So.2d 115 (1945); see FLA. STAT. § 440.27(8)
(1949)'.
164. See notes 127, 131 supra.
165. FLA. STAT. § 440.26 (1949); St. Petersburg v. Mosedale, 146 Fla. 784, 1 So.2d
878 (1941); Lakeland v. Burton, 147 Fla. 412, 2 So.2d 731 (1941); S. H. Kress & Co.
v. Burkes, 153 Fla. 868, 16 So.2d 106 (1944).
166. Fort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey, 155 Fla. 769, 21 So.2d 451 (1945);
Briggs v. Tripure Products Co., 152 Fla. 749, 13 So.2d 152 (1943); Sims Tire Serv.,
Inc. v. Parker, 146 Fla. 23, 200 So. 524 (1941); Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. Moore,
143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495 (1940); Firestone Auto Supply & Serv. Stores v. Bullard, 141
Fla. 282, 192 So. 865 (1940).
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The employer is required to submit a report of the injury or death to
the Commission within ten days after receiving knowledge of it, and such
reports shall not be evidence of any fact stated.6 7 It was held where the
parties had stipulated before the deputy commissioner that the medical re-
port should become a part of the record, that such medical report could be
used as evidence, the court saying: "the medical report was accepted by all
parties as stating the true circumstances under which the injury occurred."'' 8
PAYMENTS UNDER THE AcT18 9
Compensation is not paid to an injured employee for the first four
days of his disability; however, this waiting period does not affect the med-
ical benefits provided under the Act'70 since such benefits are not considered
compensation.' 7' Under the Act, the employee is not entitled to recover
any amount disbursed for medical service unless he has first requested his
employer to furnish such service. All claims for medical treatment, to be
enforceable, must be reported to the employer and the Commission by the
attending physician within twenty days following treatment. 172 Where an
employer authorized medical attention, but the physician failed to submit
medical reports within twenty days from the last date of treatment, it was
held that the employer had waived this section,173 since its purpose was to
protect the employer from "the imposition of unfounded and fraudulent
claims."' 7 4 The failure to submit medical reports within the twenty days
period is not the fault of the claimant, but it is the duty of the employer
to advise the carrier of such matters. 17 The period for submitting the med-
ical report begins "twenty days following the termination of the treatment,
(and) ... the language of this section ... is mandatory."'78 Where a claim-
ant refuses to submit to an operation, his refusal must be shown to be un-
reasonable before his claim for compensation will be denied.77 Compensa-
tion must be paid to a claimant within fourteen days after the employer
has knowledge of the accident, unless this claim is controverted by the em-
ployer. 18 If, for a period of thirty days, the employer fails to tender the
amount of compensation due under an award, the Commission may declare
the entire amount due, and the claimant may have this supplementary order
enforced by a summary proceeding in the court having jurisdiction of the
amount involved.' 7
167. FLA. STAT. § 440.36 (1949).
168. Bituminous Gas. Corp. v. Clements, 148 Fla. 175, 3 So.2d 865 (1941).
169. FLA. STAT. § 440.12, .13, .14, .15, .20, .24, .34, .54 (1949).
170. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (1949).
171. See note 62 supra.
172. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1) (1949). New Fort Pierce Hotel Co. v. Gorley, 137
la. 345, 188 So. 340 (1939).
173. FIA. STAT. § 440.13(1.. (1949).
174. Foster v. Cooper, 143 FLa. 493, 197 So. 117 (1940).
175. Consolidated Growers Assn' v. Kruse, 159 Fla. 405, 31 So.2d 545 (1947).
176. Sweat v. Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348, (1941).
177. Concord Realty Corp. v. Romano, 159 Fla. 1, 30 So.2d 495 (1947).
178. FLA. STAT. § 440.20 (1949); Cohen v. Sloan, 143 Fla. 733, 197 So. 342 (1947).
179. FLA. STAT. § 440.24 (1949); Cohen v. Sloan, 143 Fla. 733, 197 So. 342 1947).
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The amount of weekly compensation payable can not exceed twenty-
two dollars, or sixty per cent of the emplcyee's total wages.'8 0 The original
Act set a maximum total of five thousand dollars for payment of compensa-
tion, excluding medical and funeral benefits. This amount was amended in
1947 to allow compensation for a period not to exceed three hundred and
fifty weeks. However, where an employee receives two permanent injuries
in the same employment, he may receive compensation for a period not to
exceed five hundred weeks,' 8 Disability is classified under the Act as perm-
anent total, temporary total, permanent partial, or temporary partial. t8 2
Temporary total disability has been defined as that period in which a claim-
ant is unable to work.18 3 Where, after receiving temporary total compensa-
tion, a claimant has reached maximum recovery and has returned to work,
but is partially disabled for life, he is entitled to additional compensation
based on his percentage of partial total disability. Where a claimant has
returned to work, but because of a temporary disability his earning capacity
is decreased, he is entitled to sixty percent of the difference between his
wage before the injury, and his wage after the injury, 84 An employee, in-
jured permanently and totally, is entitled to compensation for a period not
to exceed three hundred and fifty weeks, subject to the statutory weekly
amount. A claimant may, as a result of an injury, draw temporary total,
permanent partial, and temporary partial disability, but the total period of
the compensation drawn thereunder cannot exceed three hundred and fifty
weeks. In a recent case, 85 it is not clear whether the court affirmed a holding
of additional temporary total, or of permanent partial disability. The Com-
mission awarded the claimant two weeks temporary total, and denied
permanent partial. The supreme court said "where medical evidence shows
that eight weeks is a fair maximum allowance for temporary total disability
in such a case . . . (that) the mere fact that claimant returned to work in
two weeks does not necessarily conclude the point." The court then affirmed
an award of eight weeks compensation. They then stated that the circuit
court had denied the claimant permanent partial disability, but that they
thought the claimant had brought himself within this section; however, they
affirmed the circuit court's holding. If they are holding that the claimant
is entitled to temporary total disability during the time he works, this would
seem to change the original interpretation of the meaning of this class of
disability.' 80
The Act 8 7 provides a penalty in an amount equal to the amount of
compensation, payable to a minor claimant, where an employer has violated
180. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (1949).
181. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(b) (1949).
182. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (1949).
183. Concord Realty Corp. v. Roniano, 159 Fla. 1, 30 So.2d 495 (1947).
184. Hart v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 152 Fla. 741, 13 So.2d 11 (1943).
185. Rosier v. Roofing & Sheet Metal Supply Co., 41 So.Zd 308 (Fla. 1949).
186. See note 183 supia.
187. FtA. STAT. § 440.54 (1949).
FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
the child labor laws of Florida. The employer alone is liable for this penalty,
and where the claimant has received an amount from the carrier equalling
the statutory maximum set under the Act,' 88 the penalty will not be in-
voked, 18' The original Act allowed attorneys' fees, as a lien upon the com-
pensation awarded, subject to the approval of the Commission. 10 The
Act' 9 ' was amended in 1941 to allow a reasonable attorneys' fee to the
claimant's attorney, in addition to the amount of compensation awarded. 192
Where the carrier has not denied liability on a claim, the court denied the
statutory assessment of attorneys' fees, indicating that the carrier is to be
allowed a reasonable time to investigate a claim, and that the burden is on
the claimant to establish a right to attorneys' fees." 3 Where the employer
has failed to secure compensation, attorneys' fees of claimant may be award-
ed against the employer.
194
The statute' 95 set five requisites in connection with claims for com-
pensation involving a hernia. The leading case 90 interpreting this section
found that a claimant "received his hernia from lifting a heavy pot of meat
while standing in a strained position, and that this unexpected incident
constituted an accident, as contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation
Act." Where a claimant refused an optration for a hernia for over two
years, an award of compensation was allowed when he died from the hernia
operation, the court holding that he had had continuous disability since
the accident. 9 T However, where a claimant testified that he did not have
an accident, or a sudden pain a hernia claim was denied.198
ELEcTiON To SUE
TORTFEASOR 9 9
The relationship between employee, independent contractor, general
contractor, and sub-contractor has been discussed;200 however, this relation-
ship also becomes important where there is a third party liable for the
claimant's injury. Where the injury is caused by the negligence of a third
person, the Act allows the claimant the choice of accepting compensation,
or proceeding against the third party. However, as previously defined,2 0'
188. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(13) (1949).
189. Lollie v. General America Tank Storage Terminals, 160 Fla. 208, 34 So.2d
306 (1948).
190. Winn-Lovett Grocery Co. v. Stevens, 145 Fla. 209, 198 So. 833 (1940).
191. Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20672, § 11.
192. Hardware Mut. Gas. Co. v. Carlton, 151 Fla. 238, 9 So.2d 359 (1942); Duff
iotel Co. v. Ficara, 151 Fla. 312, 9 So.2d 630 (1942).
193. Balatsos v. Nebraska Ave. Cafe & Liquor Store, 159 Fla. 71, 30 So.2d 633I947 .
Great American Indemnity Co. v. Smith, 156 Fla. 662, 24 So.2d 42 (1945).
195. Fx. STAT. § 440.15(6) (1949).
196. Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790 (1942).
197. Dixie Laundry v. Wentzell, 145 Fla. 569, 200 So. 860 (1940).
198. General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So.2d 908 (1944).
199. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1949).
200. See note 24, 25, 39.45 supra.
201. Ibid.
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this section does not contemplate a suit against a general contractor or sub-
contractor. A written notice of election was required by the employee prior
to the amendment in 1947; however, the present statute states that settle-
ment of a claim or commencement of an action against the third party con-
stitutes an election by the claimant. The present form of election has not
been construed by our supreme court. As to the original section, the court
said: "This section does not limit the right of action or otherwise affect
the amount of recovery in so far as the third party is concerned. 20 2 And
in Cullinane v. Crown Can Co.,208 the court said: "The manner of proceeding
if there is an election to pursue the remedy at law is not defined in the stat-
ute, but it is a fair inference that in such case the claimant thereby seeks
damages from the wrongdoer independently of any benefit under Work-
men's Compensation Law." In that case t0 ' the court held that the claimant
could not retract her election to sue the third party and make a subsequent
claim for compensation. Also where a claimant failed to make an election
and brought suit against the third party, she could not later make a claim
for compensation. 2 5 Where an employee brought suit against a third party
for damages, the court held that it was not necessary for the employee to
allege in his declaration that he had given notice of his election to sue the
third party, since such notice was only for the benefit of the person liable
for the statutory compensation. 206 Where the employer is subrogated to the
rights of the employee, the court held that notice of such assignment was
necessary to the third party before a subrogation suit would lie.20 An as-
signment of such right to sue the third party to the employer also includes
the right to sue for the physical pain and suffering of the employee. 208
Written consent of the employee, or approval by the court, is necessary
before the employer can settle the cause of action against the third party.
Where the employer recovers against the third party, he is allowed to retain
the amount of compensation paid, attorneys' fees, court costs, and any other
benefits furnished to the employee under the Act.20 1 Any excess over this
amount is paid to the claimant or his representative. The employer is al-
lowed a maximum time of eighteen months to exercise his subrogation right,
after which time the claimant may bring suit.
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